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1. berkeley’s criticisM of locke
Philosophical discussions of Molyneux’s problem within contem-porary philosophy of mind tend to characterize the problem as 
primarily concerned with the role innately known principles, amodal 
spatial concepts, and rational cognitive faculties play in our perceptual 
lives.1 Indeed, for broadly similar reasons, rationalists have generally 
advocated an affirmative answer, while empiricists have generally ad-
vocated a negative one, to the question Molyneux posed after presenting 
his famous thought experiment. This historical characterization of the 
dialectic, however, somewhat obscures the role Molyneux’s problem has 
played in spawning debates within the empiricist tradition. Fortunately, 
the differences between various empiricist accounts have been widely 
recognized and discussed among historians of philosophy working on 
the topic.2 The focus of the present essay is to develop an interpretation 
of John Locke’s views on Molyneux’s problem that best coheres with his 
other views on human understanding as well as with the predominant 
scientific opinion about the nature of perception during the period in 
which he lived.
 upon reading Essai Philosophique concernant L’Entendement, an ab-
stract of the first edition of An Essay concerning Human Understanding,3 
Irish politician and scientist William Molyneux wrote to John Locke on 
July 7, 1688, and presented him with the following question. Would a 
congenitally blind man who had learned to distinguish tactually between 
a cube and a sphere and who had just been cured of his blindness be able 
to distinguish between the cube and the sphere upon a visual presenta-
tion of them?4 Locke never responded to Molyneux’s original letter. A 
few years later, after the two had become acquaintances, Molyneux once 
again posed the question to Locke in a letter dated March 2, 1692:
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Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch 
to distinguish between a Cube, and a Sphere of the same metal, 
and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and 
t’other; which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppose then the Cube 
and Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind Man to be made to see. 
Qaere, Whether by his sight, before he touch’d them, he could now 
distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube? I answer, 
not. For, though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how 
a cube affects his touch, yet he has not yet obtained the experience, 
that what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so; or 
that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, 
shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube. (II.ix.viii, 146)
This time Locke responded by including a brief discussion of Molyneux’s 
problem in subsequent versions of the Essay. Locke quoted the portion 
of the letter above in section viii (“Ideas of Sensation often Changed by 
the Judgment”) of chapter ix (“of Perception”) of book II (“of Ideas”) of 
the Essay and endorsed Molyneux’s negative answer.
 Locke’s negative answer and endorsement of Molyneux’s justification 
for that answer raise an important interpretive difficulty. According to 
Molyneux’s justification, the reason the formerly blind person cannot tell 
which object is the sphere and which the cube is that the connections 
between our ideas of figure acquired through different sense modalities 
must be learned through experience. Nevertheless, while this justifica-
tion fits generally with the empiricist view that knowledge is grounded 
in experience and that the vehicles of all mental activity are sensory in 
nature, it seems incompatible with view that one perceives the same 
ideas through different senses. yet, Locke was firmly committed to the 
doctrine that there are such “common sensibles.”5 As he claims in the 
chapter “of Simple Ideas of Divers Senses,” “The ideas we get by more 
than one sense are, of space or extension, figure, rest, and motion. For 
these make perceivable impressions, both on the eyes and touch; and 
we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension, 
figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling” (II.v, 127).6 
Given that ideas of figure are directly perceived through both sight and 
touch, it is not clear what would stand in the way of the newly cured 
blind man’s being able to recognize the figures he now sees as the same 
as figures he had previously felt. on precisely these grounds, George 
Berkeley objected to Locke’s treatment of Molyneux’s problem:
Now, if a square surface perceived by touch be of the same sort with 
a square surface perceived by sight; it is certain the blind man here 
mentioned might know a square surface, as soon as he saw it. . . . 
We must therefore allow, either that visible extension and figures 
are specifically distinct from tangible extension and figures, or else, 
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that the solution of this problem, given by those two thoughtful and 
ingenious men, is wrong.7
Such reasoning led Berkeley to reject the doctrine of common sensibles 
and instead maintain that each sense modality has its own propri-
etary stock of ideas. While ideas of light and color are directly visually 
perceived, ideas of figure are specific to touch. Hence, in accord with 
Molyneux’s original justification, the newly cured blind man would still 
need to learn the connections between patterns of light, color, and figures 
before he could identify the sphere and the cube as such.8
 The difficulty in understanding why Locke embraced Molyneux’s jus-
tification for a negative answer becomes especially pronounced in light 
of the fact that he thought that properties such as figure are primary 
qualities and that our ideas of primary qualities exactly resemble those 
qualities themselves.9 Given this, along with the plausible supposition 
that exact resemblance is a transitive relation, it follows that a person’s 
tactile and visual ideas of figure exactly resemble each other. Thus, given 
Locke’s views about primary qualities and common sensibles, it seems 
that he should have said that the blind person would be able to call up 
and deploy the tactually acquired idea when first visually presented with 
the sphere and the cube and thereby be able to tell which is which.
2. locke’s PlaceMent of Molyneux’s tHougHt exPeriMent
Locke included a discussion of Molyneux’s thought experiment in II.ix.
viii of the second through the fourth edition of the Essay. up to this 
point in book II, Locke has discussed the origin of ideas generally, the 
nature of simple ideas, and the metaphysics of primary and secondary 
qualities. Simple ideas enter the mind through the different senses of 
taste, touch, sight, sound, and smell. These ideas cannot be separated 
into more basic components and are received passively by the mind. As 
Locke put it, “These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the under-
standing can no more refuse to have, nor alter when they are imprinted, 
nor blot them out and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, 
alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do 
therein produce” (II.i.xxv, 188). Simple ideas can represent either pri-
mary qualities or secondary qualities. Primary qualities—for example, 
figure, shape, bulk, number, and motion—are properties that inhere in 
objects themselves.10 Secondary qualities, on the other hand—for ex-
ample, tastes, colors, and smells—are dispositions or powers to produce 
ideas in subjects; they do not inhere as such in the objects themselves but 
are, in a sense, mind-dependent properties. The secondary qualities of 
an object depend on that object’s primary qualities, its categorical base, 
as well as the nature of the environment and the perceiver. Whereas 
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ideas of primary qualities always exactly resemble the qualities they 
represent, ideas of secondary qualities never do.
 Chapter ix, “of Perception,” begins Locke’s explicit treatment of the 
mind’s operations and the ideas of reflection whose object is those opera-
tions. After this, he discusses complex ideas in general, the complex ideas 
one has of modes, substances, and relations and the nature of abstraction. 
The fact that Locke does not discuss abstraction until after discussing 
Molyneux’s problem seems to block a fairly straightforward explanation 
of his verdict. Locke may have claimed that the newly cured blind per-
son’s ideas of spheres and cubes were not sufficiently general or abstract 
before visual-tactile learning. This would be consistent with Molyneux’s 
justification, but also importantly different from Berkeley, who denied 
the existence of abstract ideas. However, as Martha Brandt-Bolton points 
out, “[N]o principle of Locke’s philosophy precludes the possibility that 
a blind man should have formed an idea of a globe sufficiently abstract 
to represent a globe were he to see one.”11 So, if abstraction was part of 
Locke’s explanation for why he answers Molyneux’s question the way 
he does, he would have needed to make this case explicitly, which he 
never does.
 For present purposes, it will be important to focus on chapter ix, the 
chapter in which Locke discusses the nature of perception itself. There 
Locke turns to the importance of the interaction between perception and 
judgment. He claims, “The ideas we receive by sensation, are often, in 
grown People alter’d by the Judgment, without our taking notice of it” 
(II.ix.viii, 145). As an example of this phenomenon, Locke discusses our 
visual perception of a globe. When one looks at a globe, he claims, the 
visual idea one receives is of a flat and unevenly shaded circle. As he 
puts it, “When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour, 
v.g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted 
on our mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees 
of light and brightness coming to our eyes” (ibid.). However, because 
people are accustomed to perceiving convex surfaces in this way, “[t]he 
Judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the Appearances into 
their Causes: So that from that, which truly is variety of shadow or color, 
collecting the Figure, it makes it pass for a mark of Figure, and frames 
to it self the perception of a convex Figure and an uniform color” (ibid., 
145–46). one can tell from experience with two-dimensional paintings 
that such an alteration occurs. It is at just this point that Locke starts 
to discuss Molyneux’s problem. Accordingly, it makes sense, given its 
textual placement, that Locke’s answer to the problem deals with issues 
concerning the interaction between perception and judgment, particu-
larly as it concerns the perception of depths.12
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 Locke endorses both Molyneux’s answer to the problem, which he 
acknowledges is counterintuitive, and Molyneux’s justification for that 
answer. Afterward, Locke states his purpose for including the thought 
experiment: “This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an 
occasion for him to consider how much he may be beholden to experi-
ence, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he had not 
the least use of, or help from them” (II.ix.viii, 146). In other words, the 
purpose of presenting Molyneux’s thought experiment is to provide a 
demonstration of just how subtle and unimposing the ways in which 
judgments involving ideas antecedently acquired through experience 
can be in altering our perceptions. While people may ordinarily think 
that they directly see three-dimensional shapes, this is only because 
perception-altering judgments, once habitual, are rarely noticed.
 Locke goes on to emphasize that judgment mostly affects visual per-
ception because it is the most basic and comprehensive of human senses. 
People receive ideas of both secondary qualities, such as color, and ideas 
of primary qualities, such as figure and motion, through visual percep-
tion. This creates a conditioned response that makes people especially 
prone to mix sensation and judgment in visual perception.13 once one 
has become habituated to forming quick and immediate judgments on 
the basis of sensation, the fact that one is making such a judgment 
ceases to be transparent. It is this link between habitual judgments and 
perception that will help illuminate the consistency of Locke’s response 
to the Molyneux problem.
3. tHe role of active and Passive PercePtion  
in tHe Molyneux ProbleM
Prior to the issue of whether the person in Molyneux’s thought experi-
ment could visually distinguish the cube and the sphere is the question of 
whether that person could see the cube and sphere as three-dimensional 
figures. Laura Berchielli has argued that Locke thought that people can 
directly see three-dimensional figures without making any judgments.14 
This interpretation is suggested by the fact that Locke thought our ideas 
of primary qualities, such as figures, exactly resemble those figures.15
 The reason, Berchielli suggests, Locke thought the person in Moly-
neux’s thought experiment would not be able to recognize the figures is 
because that man would fail to recognize that his old tactile ideas and 
his new visual ideas co-refer. Just as someone can think about Hesperus 
or think about Phosphorus without knowing that their thoughts are both 
about Venus, tactile ideas and visual ideas can refer to the same figure 
without the subject thereby being in an epistemic position to recognize 
this. Berchielli posits that, although the identification could not be 
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immediately made, it would be possible for the blind man to make the 
identification after some time had passed. To understand Berchielli’s 
thoughts on how the blind man may come to make such identifications, 
drawing a distinction between passive and active mental processes will 
prove illuminating. Perceiving an idea counts as active when it requires 
either perception-altering judgments or relative movement between the 
perceiver and stimulus. A perceptual process counts as increasingly 
active to the extent that it requires perception-altering judgments or 
complex movements generated by the perceiver, for example, when it 
requires subtle tactile grasping or coordinated eye and head movement 
in order to perceive different kinds of ideas.16
 Berchielli interprets Locke as holding that the newly cured blind 
person would, after actively looking for some period of time, be able to 
identify the sphere and the cube as such. In a key passage, she claims,
In my model, the material impressions of sight in Locke are not 
(instantaneous) retinal images, but rather a succession of images. 
one is struck by the modernity of this conception of visual stimulus 
and the content of the visual idea. Sight and touch appear then to 
fit into the same general model, one in which perception needs time 
and movement to get a clear and distinct idea of form. (“Color, Space, 
and Figure in Locke,” 58)
Berchielli’s basic idea is that relative movement between lights and col-
ors, which are represented on the retina and which aggregatively form 
the visual given, allow the visual system to extract three-dimensional 
shape information noninferentially. However, when the blind man’s sight 
is restored, Locke was assuming that neither the man nor the objects 
are moving. Because there is no movement, the blind man would not 
have the proper visual input available to perceive three-dimensional 
figures directly.
 Berchielli’s interpretation does not require that the movement be 
generated by the perceiver; rather, the movement necessary to perceive 
three-dimensional objects directly as such can be generated by movement 
of the objects out in the world. Moreover, her account does not require 
that judgment is necessary in order to perceive three-dimensional figures 
visually.17 Thus, Berchielli’s account is a passive account of perception. 
This passive account manages to preserve much of what is important in 
the empiricist notion that there is a passively received epistemic foun-
dation.18 Her interpretation should clearly be commended for ingenuity 
on this point. In regard to Molyneux’s thought experiment, her specific 
interpretation has it that the newly cured blind man would only fail to 
be able to tell the difference between the sphere and the cube at first, 
that is, before he had a chance to perceive the figures moving.
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 However, Berchielli’s interpretation is tendentious and unstable. 
Ralph Schumacher has raised a number of significant problems with 
it.19 His most damaging criticism is that the interpretation requires ig-
noring the wording of Molyneux’s question, which includes the explicit 
qualification, “whether by his sight, before he touch’d them” (II.ix.,viii, 
146). Berchielli’s account makes no reference at all to touch; for her, the 
Molyneux question can be understood solely through Locke’s views on 
vision. Additionally, Schumacher objects that Berchielli’s interpretation 
fails to make sense of why Locke endorsed Molyneux’s justification for 
a negative answer to the question. That justification, recall, is in terms 
of the newly cured blind person’s having yet to learn experientially the 
necessary visual-tactile associations (ibid.). But on Berchielli’s interpre-
tation, since simply looking around would be sufficient for the person 
to be able to distinguish the figures, lacking the right visual-tactile as-
sociations is not part of the explanation.
 In order to avoid the pitfalls of following Berchielli, one might sup-
pose that Locke thought that vision was more active than she supposes. 
Locke clearly thought perception was at least sometimes active, for the 
section in which he lays out his views about the passivity of perception 
is entitled “In the Reception of Simple Ideas, the understanding Is for 
the Most Part Passive” (II.i.xxv, 118). This opens up the possibility that 
Locke thought perception could be both passive and sometimes active. 
The proposal suggested here is that some modalities tend to be more 
active (for example, vision) and some tend to be more passive (for ex-
ample, touch). So, while ideas of two-dimensional figures could be seen as 
common sensibles, passively received by both sight and touch, passively 
received ideas of three-dimensional figures could be seen as proprietary 
to touch. on this interpretation, visually perceiving three-dimensional 
figures counts as active not because doing so relies on relative move-
ment but because it requires perception-altering judgments. Ideas of 
three-dimensional figures would, thus, be a mongrel category; those 
received by touch would be passively received, whereas those received by 
sight would be actively received. This interpretation would allow Locke 
a consistent answer to the Molyneux question. The newly cured blind 
man cannot see the sphere or the cube because he has not learned how 
to make the sort of perception-altering judgments people with normal 
vision frequently do, namely, judgments that deploy tactually acquired 
ideas of three-dimensional figures.
 To bolster this interpretation, recall that when a normally sighted per-
son gazes at a convex surface, “the idea thereby imprinted in our Mind, 
is of a flat circle variously shadow’d” (II.ix.viii, 145). This suggests that 
only the idea of a two-dimensional figure is passively received through 
vision. As Locke says, it is only by an immediate and unnoticed act of 
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judgment that one transforms the visual experience of a two-dimensional 
shape into an idea of a three-dimensional surface or figure. His analogy 
to painting further suggests that two-dimensional figures alone are pas-
sively received through vision.20 Finally, it is worth noting that it was 
widely accepted among optical scientists working during Locke’s time 
that the geometrical properties of retinal images had this implication 
concerning character of the visual given.21
 on the interpretation offered here, Locke is in no way committed to 
claiming that the ideas of figures provided directly by visual experience 
are three-dimensional. However, he is quite likely committed to this 
in the case of touch. After all, unlike vision in which the scene that is 
projected onto the eyes at a moment never has more than two spatial 
dimensions, people frequently tactually encounter three dimensions 
at a moment, for example, when they hold a cube or a sphere in their 
hands. Locke also grants that once one has the ideas of lines, curve, 
angles, etc., one can form new ideas of figures through acts of judgment. 
Such judgments would allow one to obtain a geometric understanding 
of three-dimensional figures, regardless of whether one ever directly 
felt such objects. None of this undermines Locke’s stated justification 
for his verdict to Molyneux’s problem. The ability to understand the 
geometrical nature of three-dimensional figures and form new com-
plex ideas of them is not itself sufficient for the newly cured person to 
make the appropriate perception-altering judgments utilizing tactually 
acquired ideas of figures and cubes. That ability arises only from ha-
bitually visually experiencing three-dimensional objects that are also 
engaged tactually.
 In order to round off the defense of this interpretation, one last in-
terpretive option must be considered and dispensed with. In her essay, 
“The Real Molyneux Problem and the Basis of Locke’s Answer,” Martha 
Brandt-Bolton has also interpreted Locke as positing that the newly 
cured blind person could not see three-dimensional shapes as three-
dimensional shapes without the aid of perception-altering judgments. 
However, her interpretation of Locke has it that Locke held a view of 
perception that is far too active for his empiricist sensibilities. She also 
maintains that Locke “claimed entirely without restriction that we see 
figures by judging color and shading” and that “when he considered Mo-
lyneux’s question, he assumed that bodily shapes are not immediately 
given to sight” (82–83).22 To support this assertion, she calls attention 
to the fact that Locke claims that form “is truly a variety of shadow or 
color, collecting the figure” and that the “proper object” of sight is “light 
and colours” (II.ix.viii, 145). However, as argued above, it should be clear 
that Locke did indeed think that people directly see two-dimensional 
figures. Furthermore, as Berchielli points out, Brandt-Bolton’s interpre-
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tation requires that Locke was being metaphorical when he described 
perceiving a convex surface as leaving an idea of “flat circle” (ibid). More 
troubling, if Brandt-Bolton is right, then Locke’s empiricist epistemology 
would be in peril. Her view would saddle Locke with an overly active 
view of perception, antithetical to his empiricist epistemology. If one 
always needed to make a judgment in order to perceive a figure and if 
judgments are made up of ideas, then one would need ideas to perceive 
any figures, which implies that one would need innate ideas to see figures 
in the first instance.
 In sum, the interpretation defended here takes an intermediate 
position on the extent to which simple ideas are perceived actively. 
Pace the hyperactive position of Brandt-Bolton, given Locke’s inclusion 
of “figure” both as a common sensible and as a simple idea, it is likely 
that he thought the newly cured blind person could see two-dimensional 
geometrical figures without the aid of judgment. Pace Berchielli, given 
Locke’s views on perception-altering judgments and depth perception, it 
is unlikely that the newly cured blind person could see three-dimensional 
geometrical figures without the aid of judgment. The interpretation 
defended here allows that three-dimensional geometric figures must 
be actively visually perceived because the perception requires some 
perception-altering judgments. Although one can passively perceive 
three-dimensional objects through touch, one could not transfer the 
tactile idea of (for example) “cube” to the visual because the visual idea 
of cube requires active judgments. These judgments would require some 
prior cross-modal experience and training. one would have to have a 
habitual connection between touching the three-dimensional object and 
seeing the three-dimensional object before one could make the correct 
perception-altering judgments.
4. consciousness and tHe Molyneux ProbleM
one may object that the interpretation defended here is ruled out on the 
grounds that it requires that Locke thought that there were unconscious 
mental states. This would be problematic because many interpret Locke 
as holding the view that the mind is necessarily conscious.23 For example, 
in their essay “Locke on Consciousness,” Angela Coventry and uriah 
Kriegel claim, “Locke says explicitly that mental states are necessarily 
conscious in numerous passages. . . . [I]t was deemed a conceptual truth 
that all mental states are conscious in the sense that one is conscious of 
them, or is aware of being in them.” Their claim seems to be suggested 
strongly by passages like the following: “Whilst it thinks and perceives, 
it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble, as well as any other 
perceptions; and it must necessarily be conscious of its own perceptions” 
(II.i.xii, 108).
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 It seems, then, that any interpretation that claims that unnoticed 
and habitual perception-altering judgments play an essential role in 
Locke’s justification for a negative answer to Molyneux’s question must 
be squared with his views on consciousness. Although a case can be made 
that Locke did indeed countenance unconscious judgments, the present 
account can sidestep the question of Locke’s views on consciousness.24 
For the present interpretation, all that is necessary is that sometimes 
one does not realize that one is making perception-altering judgments. 
Locke could allow that, though perception-altering judgments are 
conscious, they are also ephemeral and immediately forgotten after be-
coming conscious. What the perception-altering-judgment interpretation 
needs is not that Locke allows for unconscious states; rather it requires 
acknowledging that certain judgments are rarely noticed or attended to. 
Nothing Locke says rules out the possibility that he thought perception-
altering judgments were conscious but usually unnoticed.25
5. tHe aMbiguous nature of Molyneux’s Question
What has probably become clear from the above discussion is that Mo-
lyneux’s question is underdescribed as posed. Before it can be answered, 
more constraints need to be added. Is the question supposed to be about 
whether the formerly blind man can make the identification immediately 
after opening his eyes? Is it about whether he can make it after looking 
at the objects for some short but significant amount of time? Is the man 
allowed to move his eyes and head once sight is returned? Is he able to 
get up and walk around the objects? If he is stationary, can the objects 
move around, or must they also be stationary? Answers to these ques-
tions may change how Locke would have answered Molyneux’s specific 
question. Since Molyneux’s original intent is unclear, this essay cannot 
necessarily answer his question once and for all. Nevertheless, the cross-
modal learning account defended here helps one see how Locke would 
have responded to different variants of Molyneux’s problem.
 The suggested interpretation can be used to determine what Locke’s 
answers to other variants of the Molyneux problem would have been. 
one variant, originally due to Denis Diderot, is a different dimensional 
variant of the problem.26 Diderot asks the reader to consider whether 
a newly cured blind person, who had previously learned to distinguish 
circles from squares, would be able tell the difference upon a visual 
presentation of them. Another variant involves the story’s being told 
in reverse, that is, as starting with a sighted person who could tell 
the difference between a sphere and a cube visually but could not 
feel things through touch.27 In both variant cases, Locke would have 
answered affirmatively had Molyneux presented him with those cases, 
even if it was specified that the formerly blind man and the objects 
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were stationary. In regard to the first case, the newly sighted person 
would be able to distinguish the circle from the square because the 
intermodal connections would not need to be learned through habitu-
ation; rather, the man would just open his eyes and be able to see 
reflexively the two-dimensional figures as two-dimensional figures.28 
In the other case, since the man with the new sense of touch could 
directly and passively perceive the simple ideas of the sphere and the 
cube, or any other three-dimensional shape, it follows that he would 
be able to recognize them upon first touch.
6. conclusion
Molyneux’s thought experiment was widely discussed among the intel-
lectual class throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in 
part because it was discovered that certain forms of blindness could be 
cured. Thus, it came to be regarded as an empirical issue capable of ex-
perimental resolution. Contemporary cognitive science has identified a 
number of different strands of evidence relevant to its resolution. on the 
one hand, there is ample evidence that blind subjects whose blindness 
is cured in adulthood, through cataract surgery, for example, are unable 
at first to recognize cubes and spheres visually.29 However, these experi-
ments have not involved congenitally blind subjects, that is, subjects 
completely blind from birth. In fact, due to the way their brains develop 
differently, it is unlikely that congenitally blind subjects can be made 
to see altogether.30 on the other hand, evidence from developmental 
psychology suggests that neonates are capable of cross-modal transfer 
without learning. For instance, a series of studies ran by Arlette Streri 
and colleagues have shown that infants, sixteen to one hundred hours 
old, can identify three-dimensional objects by sight after previously only 
handling the objects.31 The infants had one of the two objects placed in 
their hand until they habituated to the object (infants “habituate” to 
a stimulus once they have become bored with the object). Immediately 
after habituation, infants had both the object they handled and the novel 
object shown to them visually. Infants significantly and reliably looked 
longer at the novel object, regardless of which object they received dur-
ing the tactile-habituation phase. This experimental paradigm is based 
upon the well-tested assumption that infants will look longer at novel 
objects than at familiar ones. Thus, it seems that neonates are able to 
recognize by sight the three-dimensional objects they had previously 
only experienced by touch, without prior visual-tactile learning. While 
this case is not precisely analogous to the Molyneux case, both because 
of neural plasticity and because the infants are not actually blind prior 
to being visually presented with the three-dimensional objects for the 
first time, it does raise a significant worry for any thoroughgoing empiri-
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cism. That said, Locke could not have anticipated these results. Given 
what he did know and what he thought about the mind more generally, 
his views were indeed coherent and internally consistent.32
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